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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE**

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**AIR FORCE RESERVE COMMAND  
Supplement 1**

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**Security**

**SECURITY POLICE STANDARDS AND  
PROCEDURES**

**COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY**

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This instruction implements AFRPD 31-1, *Physical Security*; and AFRPD 31-2, *Law Enforcement*. It provides guidance pertaining to general security police duties and law enforcement operations. Chapters 9, 10, and 11 do not apply to Air National Guard (ANG) units or members.

**(AFRC)** This supplement implements and extends guidance of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-201, 1 May 1997. The AFI is published word-for-word without editorial review. Air Force Reserve supplementary material is indicated by “(AFRC)” in boldface type. This supplement describes Air Force Reserve procedures to be used in conjunction with the basic instruction. Upon receipt of this integrated supplement discard the Air Force basic.

**SUMMARY OF REVISIONS**

This revision deletes the requirement to use only 'HR' or higher rated tires on law enforcement sedans; deletes requirement to have a CB radio on each law enforcement desk (paragraph 4.5.4.); authorizes the use of in-car video (paragraph 4.11.); deletes requirement for high speed pursuit policy (paragraph 6.7.) through establishment of USAF Security Police Model Vehicle Operation Policy (paragraph 6.7. - 6.7.5 and Attachment 1); deletes requirement to handcuff all in-custody personnel prior to transport; adds crime prevention guidance (Chapter 12) and security police lessons learned (Chapter 13 and Attachment 4); provides requirements and guidance for hostage incidents and Emergency Service Teams (EST); and updates forms prescribed by this instruction. A | indicates revised material since last edition.

**(AFRC)** This revision changes AFRES to AFRC in all supplemented information; identifies supervisor responsibility to provide proper equipment for handling suspected hazards (paragraph 3.2.4); provides guidance on submitting request to use vehicle installed video surveillance systems (paragraph 4.11.1); provides guidance on training for jurisdiction issues (paragraph 6.1); provides guidance on reporting

Civilian Law Enforcement Assistance (CLEA) (paragraph 6.3); provides instruction to make rights advisement forms available to commanders and first sergeants (paragraph 7.5); provides additional precautions on handcuffing (paragraph 7.6.1); provides guidance on training for use of police club and riot baton (paragraph 7.6.3); and guidance on reporting Security Forces Lessons Learned through MAJCOM (paragraph 13.3). A | indicates revision from previous edition.

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## Chapter 1

### FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

**1.1. HQ United States Air Force Director of Security Forces (HQ USAF/SF).** Develops guidance for all law enforcement and security programs, and manages and coordinates security police equipment programs.

**1.2. HQ Air Force Security Police Agency (HQ AFSPA).** Provides Air Force commanders with guidance on implementation of law enforcement and security programs.

**1.3. Major Command (MAJCOM) Chief of Security Police.** Establishes command unique programs and policies to ensure protection of command installations, personnel, and resources.

**1.4. Installation Commander.** Establishes base programs and policies to afford a reasonable level of protection to personnel and resources.

**1.5. Installation Chief of Security Police (CSP).** Designs security police programs to protect the personnel and resources assigned or attached to the installation.

## Chapter 2

### SECURITY POLICE MISSIONS

**2.1. Aerospace Systems Security.** Security police provide security for and protect combat-ready weapon systems from sabotage, espionage, subversion, and attack.

**2.1. (AFRC)** The OPR for aerospace systems security is HQ AFRC/SFOS.

**2.2. Law Enforcement.** Security police law enforcement responsibilities include installation entry control, crime prevention, traffic control, resources protection, limited criminal investigations, and motor vehicle accident investigations.

**2.2. (AFRC)** The OPR for law enforcement issues is HQ AFRC/SFOL. Law enforcement includes community policing philosophies and programs.

**2.3. Antiterrorism.** Security police maintain the capability to protect Air Force resources and personnel from terrorism and respond to terrorist attacks.

**2.3. (AFRC)** The OPR for antiterrorism is HQ AFRC/SFOF. Antiterrorism includes Force Protection programs and initiatives.

**2.4. Air Base Defense.** During periods of increased tension, conflict, or war, security police provide the combat capability to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attacks. Air base defense is a common task of all security police specialties.

**2.4. (AFRC)** The OPR for air base defense is HQ AFRC/SFOF.

**2.5. Corrections.** Security police units administer and operate all Air Force corrections facilities and are responsible for the security of inmates. This includes facility security, work detail supervision, hospital prisoner ward security, and transient prisoner security. Law enforcement specialists perform corrections-related duties.

**2.5. (AFRC)** AFRC units do not maintain or administer corrections programs.

**2.6. Information Security.** Security police manage the Air Force information security, personnel security, industrial security, and the classification management programs.

**2.6. (AFRC)** The OPR for information, personnel, and industrial security is HQ AFRC/SFOI.

**2.7. Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM).**

**2.7. (AFRC)** The OPR for combat arms issues is HQ AFRC/SFOC.

2.7.1. Manages the installation ground firearms training and qualification program.

2.7.2. Performs inspection, maintenance, and repair of ground firearms.

2.7.3. Operates installation firing ranges and firearms field maintenance shops.

2.7.4. CATM is normally part of the local security police unit.



## Chapter 3

### SECURITY POLICE PERSONNEL

**3.1. Security Police Code of Conduct.** No code or set of rules will specify exactly what you should do in every situation. However, the following code provides general guidelines.

3.1.1. Exercising Authority. As on-duty security police, you are the visible representatives of the US Government, the Air Force, the installation commander, and the installation chief of security police. It is your duty to accept the authority entrusted to you and to carry out this important trust impartially, firmly, and in a manner that commands respect from the public.

3.1.2. Fulfilling the Mission. The enforcement of laws and regulations dealing with members of the US Armed Forces brings security police into direct contact with the public. In fulfilling the security police mission, you must deal with offenders in a dignified manner. Refrain from being disobedient, insulting, or offensive to the public.

3.1.3. Personal Appearance. Maintain a high standard of appearance IAW AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Personnel*. Set the example for all to follow.

3.1.4. Personal Attitudes. Perform your duties in an impartial, just, friendly, and helpful manner. The Air Force will not tolerate biases based on age, physical disability, race, religion, national origin, creed, or gender. Do not discuss offenses or incidents, except in the line of duty. In addition, you can not accept any advantage, gratuity, or reward for performing official duties.

3.1.5. Assistance to Others. Render assistance to the public. Promptly assist any injured or ill individuals.

3.1.6. Attention to Duty. Remain mindful of your duty commitments. Do not consume any form of intoxicant while on duty or within eight hours of a duty tour.

**3.1.6. (AFRC)** The blood alcohol content (BAC) standard for military and civilian personnel bearing firearms is zero. No person shall be issued or bear firearms when a trace of alcohol is detected.

3.1.7. Seeking Favors. Do not seek personal advantage through your status as security police. Don't try to gain favor or popularity by showing favoritism, overlooking violations, or otherwise failing to enforce the law.

3.1.8. Punishment of Offenders. As security police, you have the authority only to apprehend, based on reasonable grounds. Do not punish offenders. Use your discretion to correct, caution, or warn someone for minor violations of the law, but you may not admonish or reprimand.

3.1.9. Apprehension of Suspects. Protect the health and welfare of all apprehended suspects. Use force according to AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*. The USAF will not tolerate the intentional mistreatment of apprehended suspects. Don't use abusive, profane, or insulting language toward a suspect or show disregard for the suspect's valuables, personal property, or physical well being.

3.1.10. Dealing with Intoxicated Persons. Apprehend personnel obviously intoxicated beyond any sense of self-control and mobility. Make every effort to avoid verbal and physical confrontations.

3.1.11. Off Duty Conduct. You represent the security police force 24 hours a day, regardless of the duty schedule. Therefore, your conduct must always remain above reproach.

**3.2. Duties and Responsibilities.** Security police duties and responsibilities vary greatly from installation to installation. Installation CSPs should define the number and limits of security police posts, as well as assigned duties, in local duty or post instructions. Our three basic duties and responsibilities are always the same. They are:

3.2.1. Take charge of your post by securing and protecting personnel and property for which you are responsible until properly relieved. Comply with orders and instructions given. These responsibilities continue until relieved by proper authority.

3.2.2. Report all violations of orders you must enforce. You have the authority to apprehend anyone violating those orders. Notify the appropriate control center of the apprehension and detain the apprehended person until assistance arrives. Written procedures can not cover all situations. In such situations, you must exercise discretion and act according to your best judgment. Immediately contact your superior for instructions.

3.2.3. Give the alarm in case of disorder or emergency. Report any unusual event that threatens the security of the installation or endangers life or property. Take reasonable counteraction to save life and property or lessen danger. At the same time, you must maintain the security of your post and remain alert for other possible violations during the emergency.

**3.2.4. (Added-AFRC)** Special precautions must always be taken when at a site where known or suspected hazards are present (body fluids, drug paraphernalia, toxic chemicals, etc.) Supervisors ensure subordinates are properly equipped to safely assist during these situations. Patrols must be equipped with a kit to provide protection from bloodborne pathogens (see paragraph 4.7.8 of this instruction).

## Chapter 4

### SECURITY POLICE DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

**4.1. General Information.** As security police, you wear a distinctive uniform for quick identification. Because you are constantly in the "public eye," you must set the highest standard of dress and appearance. AFI 36-2903, *Dress and Personal Appearance of Personnel*, contains guidance on proper wear of security police uniforms.

**4.2. The Security Police Shield.** Only uniformed security police wear the security police shield. Don't abuse this symbol of authority for personal gain. AFI 31-206, *Security Police Investigations*, establishes procedures for display of the shield by security police investigators not in uniform.

4.2.1. The following guidelines apply to the issue and wear of the security police shield:

4.2.1.1. Issue metallic shields IAW Table of Allowance (TA) 016, *Table of Allowances for Special Purpose Clothing and Personal Equipment*.

4.2.1.2. Use AF Form 538, **Personal Clothing and Equipment Record**, or a similar automated product, to record shield issues.

4.2.1.3. Upon PCS of the bearer, forward the AF Form 538 or automated product to the gaining unit IAW procedures established in AFM 67-1, Vol. II, Part 2.

4.2.1.4. Reissue serviceable shields turned in due to loss of Air Force specialty code (AFSC) or other disqualifying factors.

4.2.1.5. Wear the metallic shield only on the blue uniform combinations.

4.2.1.6. Don't wear or carry the shield while in civilian clothes except as authorized for security police investigators performing official duties.

4.2.1.7. Security police who are retraining or separating from the service turn in their security police shield to the shield issuing activity. The installation CSP may elect to present the shield to retiring security police or the next of kin to security police who die while on active duty.

**4.3. The Law Enforcement Qualification Badge.** CSPs at each level may authorize persons in their command to wear this badge. HQ USAF/SF may authorize appropriate persons to wear the badge. Award this badge to military personnel who acquire certain skill levels and demonstrate honorable service in the security police career field. Award the badge according to AFI 36-2923, *Aeronautical, Duty, and Occupational Badges*.

4.3.1. Allied nation, other US service, and other USAF personnel performing instructor or liaison duty with an Air Force security police organization wear the qualification badge commensurate with time requirements listed in AFI 36-2923.

4.3.2. Officers and airmen assigned to the US Air Force Reserve (USAFR) or ANG are eligible for award of the qualification badge under paragraph 4.3.

4.3.3. Once approved, present the badge at an appropriate ceremony.

4.3.4. The installation CSP (at all levels) may rescind the badge anytime the bearer loses their security police AFSC for misconduct.

**4.4. Resources and Equipment (SPX).** HQ AFSPA/SPX identifies and evaluates commercially available and government-developed equipment necessary to support service-wide needs for security, law enforcement, corrections, CATM, information security, and air base defense personnel. SPX:

4.4.1. Serves as the central point of contact for security police logistics information throughout the Air Force.

4.4.2. Disseminates security police equipment information, test reports, and material deficiencies.

4.4.3. Monitors new and emerging technologies for security police applications.

4.4.4. Manages, monitors, or provides approval authority, as appropriate, for the following TAs dealing with security police equipment:

4.4.4.1. TA 001 -- *Master Equipment Management Index*.

4.4.4.2. TA 002 -- *Monthly Allowance Notice (Update)*.

4.4.4.3. TA 009 -- *Small Computers and Equipment*.

4.4.4.4. TA 012 -- *Vehicles*.

4.4.4.5. TA 016 -- *Clothing*.

4.4.4.6. TA 538 -- *Security Police Equipment (General) and Weapons*.

4.4.4.7. TA 629 -- *Audio Visual*.

4.4.4.8. TA 660 -- *Communications Equipment*.

4.4.5. SPR conducts an annual Air Force security police equipment workshop to update equipment listings, provide a forum to work security police-related equipment problems and issues, and work logistics detail issues with MAJCOM security police staff representatives.

**4.5. Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Systems .** The LMR system is the primary means of communication used to control security police operations. MAJCOMs determine requirements for "secure voice" equipment.

4.5.1. Security police use standard practices to ensure the radio net operates smoothly during normal and emergency situations. Don't use slang language. Military radio transmissions must comply with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations. The Allied Communication Publication (ACP) 125 (E) dated 1 Aug 87, prescribes procedures for security police using two-way radios.

4.5.2. Net Control Station. When two or more two-way radios use a single radio net (frequency), establish a net control station according to the local installation communications officer's direction.

4.5.3. Commanders ensure a positive Communications Security (COMSEC) program exists for radio communications when they:

4.5.3.1. Use standard response codes to identify the urgency of each radio dispatch (See Attachment 1 for established response codes).

4.5.3.2. Devise a local duress or signal codes to indicate an emergency or duress situation when one does not wish to alert any unauthorized listeners.

4.5.3.3. Decode data encryption system equipped radios before servicing.

4.5.3.4. Decode vehicle radios before releasing the vehicle to any maintenance activity.

4.5.4. Consider equipping the law enforcement desk with a citizens band (CB) two-way radio to aid in crime prevention and incident reporting, and a two-way radio capable of communicating on the commonwealth, host-state, or territory police emergency frequency. If a two-way radio is not available or practical, use a mutually agreed upon system that facilitates rapid emergency notification to civilian police like E-911. Negotiate for and fund such equipment at the installation level. Set up operating instructions according to host-state, commonwealth, or territorial laws or police regulations.

**4.6. Telephone Systems .** Commercial and tactical telephone systems augment the LMR. Connect all fixed security police posts to the law enforcement desk or central security control by dial or direct telephone lines.

4.6.1. The FCC regulates communications by wire and radio. Military radio transmissions are subject to FCC monitoring and regulation. FCC regulations prohibit:

4.6.1.1. Use of profane or obscene language in radio transmissions.

4.6.1.2. Use of false or deceptive signals or communications.

4.6.1.3. Operation of an unlicensed station.

4.6.1.4. Operation of a station by unauthorized personnel.

**4.7. Vehicle Equipment.** TAs and technical orders (TO) establish authorized equipment and markings. As a minimum, equip permanently assigned non-tactical vehicles with the following:

4.7.1. Warning Light System. Use a warning light system in the form of a magnetic or permanent mount-type single or multiple flasher, rotating, or strobe light system. Mount the system either on the vehicle roof, on a "roof bar," on the dashboard and rear window platform, or on the front bumper and the rear window platform. Do not mount lights inside the vehicle front grill.

4.7.2. Siren System. Use either the traditional "fire engine" or electronic sirens. Mount the siren in concert with a roof-mounted warning light system or under the vehicle hood.

4.7.3. Public Address System. Use either a portable system ("bullhorn") or a permanent system. Mount the system in concert with a roof-mounted warning light bar system or under the vehicle's hood.

4.7.4. Spotlight. Use either a portable spotlight (battery-operated or cigarette lighter plug-in type) or a permanently mounted spotlight. If you use a permanent-mount type, mount the spotlight on the vehicle roof, "roof bar," or on the driver's side door frame pillar.

4.7.5. Land Mobile Radio. Use a permanently mounted multichannel mobile or "portamobile" radio. Install radios so the driver has easy access to all radio controls and microphones and so radio equipment does not interfere with safe vehicle operation.

**4.7.5. (AFRC)** A security force member equipped with a portable radio meets the requirement until permanently mounted equipment can be procured and installed. For temporary use or loaner vehicles, patrolman portable radios suffice.

4.7.6. A general purpose first aid kit (FSN 6545-00-922-1200 or equivalent).

4.7.7. Extinguisher--a 2 1/2 pound ABC rated dry chemical fire extinguisher.

4.7.8. Bloodborne Pathogen Protective Kit (required in all security police vehicles). Contents must include one-way respiratory cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) mask, surgical gloves, eye protective goggles or glasses with side shields, surgical mask, and surgical gown. The installation CSP and installation medical officer determine other contents of the kit. Train those personnel determined to have occupational exposure to bloodborne pathogens to use kit contents. [Attachment 2](#) contains the requirements for a Bloodborne Pathogen Exposure Control Plan.

**4.8. Vehicle Identification Markings .** All vehicle markings must comply with TO 36-1-3, *Painting, Marking, and Lighting Requirements for USAF Vehicles*.

4.8.1. As a minimum, mark all security police vehicles on the driver's and front passenger's doors (vehicles marked IAW T.O. 36-1-3 meet this requirement). The markings may be magnetic or permanent-mount type. Each sign will have "SECURITY POLICE" printed in black or ultramarine blue letters on a reflective white background. Lettering is a minimum of 3 inches in height. You may use a magnetic 18-inch or larger security police shield replica instead of the "security police" sign.

4.8.2. When security police vehicles are temporarily out of service due to maintenance, you may use "loaner" vehicles for security police patrol. Equip such vehicles with a magnetic rotating, flashing, or strobe warning light and magnetic "SECURITY POLICE" or shield replica signs.

4.8.3. Equip and mark tactical security police vehicles according to installation or MAJCOM directives.

**4.9. Speedometer Calibration.** Calibrate the speedometers of all traffic patrol vehicles at least semiannually or sooner if local laws are more stringent. Recalibrate the vehicle's speedometer any time there are major maintenance repairs to a traffic patrol vehicle's transmission, differential, speedometer, or after tire replacement.

**4.10. Vehicle and Vehicle Equipment Care.** Before each tour of duty, inspect vehicles and vehicle equipment for safety and maintenance deficiencies. Test all warning lights, sirens, public address systems, spotlights, etc. Report deficiencies to the vehicle maintenance branch as soon as possible. Vehicles should always present a clean appearance, weather permitting.

**4.11. Vehicle Installed Video Surveillance Systems.** Units may use vehicle installed video surveillance systems as a tool to enhance their law enforcement and public safety role. Carefully evaluate the cost and the need before buying video systems. The following guidelines apply:

4.11.1. MAJCOMs approve unit requests for video system use. Units must develop policy governing their use, control, disposition of film, etc., before purchase. As a minimum, the vehicle mounted video system may only be used when actively engaged in patrol activities and cannot be in use when the vehicle is parked and unattended.

**4.11.1. (AFRC)** Submit unit request to use vehicle installed video surveillance systems to HQ AFRC/SFOL.

4.11.2. There is no centrally managed procurement program. Units must determine needs locally and procure the appropriate system that best meets their needs. Consult state and local requirements for possible restrictions.

4.11.3. Follow standard supply acquisition procedures.

## Chapter 5

### SECURITY POLICE ACTIVITIES

**5.1. Security Police Guardmount.** Guardmount is a ceremony conducted at the start of the security police shift. Use guardmount to determine the readiness of personnel, to include their appearance and mental and physical condition. Use guardmount to conduct roll call, announcements, security status briefing, weapons inspection, and post assignments. You should also use guardmount as a recognition ceremony for deserving personnel.

**5.2. Installation Entry Control.** Controlling entry to the installation is a fundamental security police task. We control entry to facilitate vehicle and pedestrian access in an orderly, safe, and secure manner, and to provide controls to help protect the resources entrusted to the Air Force. The installation entry controller is a very visible sign of the professionalism and strength of an Air Force installation and its assigned mission. Accordingly, entry controllers represent the most senior authority on base--usually the wing commander. Because of their location, they are normally the first contact the public has with the Air Force base. For this reason, the installation entry controller is often referred to as the Air Force's "ambassador to the public."

5.2.1. Control entry to the base in a manner that brings credit to the Air Force. A properly established installation entry control function begins with a professionally constructed gate house which provides protection from adverse weather and accommodations for continuous operation. Safety and security for people transiting that location is inherent in its design. Finally, it provides an aesthetic quality which reflects the pride of the wing's mission and the professionalism of Air Force operating style. The gate house is then staffed with sharp, energetic, and courteous security police professionals. The Air Force places great value on properly conducted installation entry control because it reflects the confidence, strength, and trust of our superiors and the American people.

**5.3. Post Checks.** On-duty supervisory personnel conduct post checks to ensure posted personnel are alert and knowledgeable of the assigned duties and responsibilities. Post checks include an inspection of security police facilities and equipment.

**5.4. Post Visits.** Post visits are a means for senior security police representatives to visit on-duty security police to verify their job knowledge and performance in their work environment. It is also a way to inspect facilities, take questions, detect problem areas, and ascertain the welfare of personnel. Conduct post visits during both traditional and non-traditional duty hours.

**5.5. Post Reporting.** Report the status of your post to the senior person conducting the post check or visit.

**5.6. Peacekeeper Challenge (PKC).** PKC is an annual police skills competition sponsored by HQ USAF/SF. Representative teams from MAJCOMs, ANG, USAFR, and selected allied countries compete in physical endurance, marksmanship, and combat-related events.

## Chapter 6

### JURISDICTION, LIMITATIONS, AND LIABILITY

**6.1. Jurisdiction.** The installation staff judge advocate is the focal point for determining security police jurisdiction. You must know the jurisdiction on your installation.

**6.1. (AFRC)** Incorporate training on base and local jurisdiction in unit Phase 1 training programs.

6.1.1. As security police, you are representatives of the US Government, the US Armed Forces, the installation commander, and the installation chief of security police. The Manual for Courts-Martial, Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), Rule 302(b)(1), gives you the authority to apprehend individuals. Carry out this important trust in a fair, impartial and firm manner.

6.1.2. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 136(b)(6), gives you the authority to administer oaths to witnesses and suspects, as necessary, in the performance of your duties.

**6.2. Posse Comitatus Act.** The Congress of the United States enacted this law in 1878 to restrict the use of the military to enforce civil law, Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385. See also 10 United States Code Section 375.

6.2.1. This act prevents military personnel from executing the laws of the states or the laws of the United States except when acting under the authority of the US Constitution, an Act of Congress, and under the direction of the President of the United States. Posse Comitatus governs the use of military personnel only within the CONUS.

6.2.2. This act does not prevent:

6.2.2.1. Military authorities from taking action on incidents involving civilian personnel when such action involves a specific military purpose.

6.2.2.2. A military member acting in an unofficial capacity to make a citizen's arrest or to take other action to preserve the public peace.

6.2.2.3. Security police from using force to stop a fleeing felon or suspected felon for the purpose of aiding civilian law enforcement.

6.2.3. Off-duty security police (enlisted or commissioned) may serve as members of a civilian police agency as active duty or reserve duty police officers. While acting as civilian police officers, you act as private citizens and not in the official capacity of members of the US Armed Forces. Active duty commissioned officers must consult with their local staff judge advocate to ensure such employment does not violate the intent of federal statutes.

**6.3. Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (CLEA).** Security police may support CLEAs as authorized by federal laws and executive orders.

**6.3. (AFRC)** Submit reports on CLEA support along with National Incident-Based Reports System (NIBRS) reports quarterly. Do not combine the two reports.

**6.4. Support to the US Secret Service (USSS) and US State Department (DOS).** Refer requests for assistance from other federal agencies to AFOSI. When appropriately tasked to assist, Security police support the USSS in the protection of the President and Vice President of the United States, major politi-



cal candidates, and visiting foreign heads of state. When assigned to such duty, you are subject to the overall supervision of the Director, USSS, or Director of Diplomatic Security, as appropriate. If working under the auspices of AFOSI for protective services, Security Police work under the supervision of the AFOSI Protective Detail Leader.

**6.5. Martial Law.** The term "martial law" means "the temporary military government of a civilian population." Declaring US federal martial law might require the US to exercise jurisdiction over the civilian population. In time of an emergency, military jurisdiction over the civilian population extends beyond the restoration of law and order. It provides relief and rehabilitation of the people, the resumption of industrial production, the re-establishment of the economy, and the protection of life and property.

**6.6. Personal Liability.** Military and civilian courts may review acts performed by military personnel during martial law for damages or in criminal proceedings.

**6.7. Vehicle Operation.** Each CSP must ensure security police personnel understand and follow vehicle operation guidelines in this section and in the USAF Model Vehicle Operation Policy shown at [Attachment 1](#). CSPs may modify this policy to reflect local laws or conditions. The primary concern in emergency driving situations is the protection of the lives and safety of all citizens. You must not endanger the public as a result of your driving. Nuclear and chemical resource recovery operations are exempt from the provisions of this section.

6.7.1. Pursuit Driving. Pursuit driving is an extremely dangerous practice. The Air Force policy is that pursuit driving is inherently dangerous and should be avoided except in extreme situations. Examples of extreme situations include, but are not limited to: Pursuing a vehicle with material that is extremely dangerous to others, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical munitions or components; Pursuing a vehicle whose occupant(s) are suspects in an incident in which deadly force would be authorized. In situations where deadly force would not be authorized, consider an alternative course of action. Alternatives to pursuit driving include vehicle intercept, where security police strategically move their vehicles into a position to block the suspect vehicle, without the use of high speed or code. In another option, security police or witnesses obtain detailed descriptions of the vehicle, its direction of travel, and descriptions and number of individuals inside the vehicle. This information is quickly passed to the local law enforcement officials to assist in locating the suspect vehicle.

6.7.1.1. When engaged in a vehicle pursuit, you must weigh the need to immediately apprehend a suspect against the danger created by the pursuit. Extreme caution must be exercised to ensure public safety.

6.7.2. Safety. At no time will pursuit driving endanger the public, security police involved in the pursuit, Air Force resources, or contribute to the loss of control of the vehicle.

6.7.3. Responsibility. Responsibility for the decision to pursue an offender initially rests with each vehicle operator. Carefully evaluate each situation. If you determine pursuit driving is necessary, consider the following factors:

**6.7.3. (AFRC)** Incorporate pursuit guidelines into unit Phase 1 training programs.

6.7.3.1. Mission Impact

6.7.3.2. Local policy.

6.7.3.3. The degree of danger to the public.

6.7.3.4. The degree of danger to you and fellow patrols.

6.7.3.5. Your experience and training.

6.7.3.6. Weather and road conditions.

6.7.3.7. Time of day (e.g. is it rush hour? Has school just let out? Is it the middle of the night with deserted streets?).

6.7.3.8. Facilities located along the route (e.g., schools, hospital, shopping centers, etc.).

6.7.3.9. Type of violation--If a suspect you witnessed or have reasonable grounds to believe has committed or attempted to commit an offense that affects Department of Defense assets vital to national security, and when their loss, damage or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission, the use of deadly force would be authorized as a last resort, when all lesser means of force are not feasible or have failed. Even if these use of force prerequisites are met, this does not mean you can or should disregard the safety of the public, other security police personnel, or yourself in exchange for a vehicle pursuit. You may be held responsible for injuries or deaths of others if you act with reckless disregard for the safety of others.

6.7.3.10. Vehicle characteristics--use of emergency equipment is essential, so ensure you turn on the siren and emergency lights. Use both throughout the pursuit. If your vehicle is not equipped with emergency lights and siren, do not pursue.

6.7.3.11. The warning effect of the siren will decrease rapidly as pursuit speed increases.

6.7.4. Radio And Driving Techniques. Use the radio sparingly and keep the frequency open for the desk sergeant and other units to assist you. Where possible, use both hands on the steering wheel to maintain control. In the case of a two-person patrol, the rider conducts the radio communications. If two separate units are involved in the pursuit, the lead patrol concentrates on the suspect vehicle while the second patrol makes all radio transmissions concerning the pursuit. When transmitting information to the desk sergeant or other units, keep calm and speak clearly and coherently as possible. Do not shout. When a pursuit begins, call the desk sergeant immediately and relay the following information:

6.7.4.1. Direction of travel.

6.7.4.2. Vehicle description and license number.

6.7.4.3. Number of occupants.

6.7.4.4. Exact reason for pursuit.

6.7.4.5. Traffic conditions and other details that will assist other patrols in the area.

6.7.5. Terminating A Pursuit. Use your best judgment in evaluating the pursuit. Continuously evaluate whether to continue or terminate the pursuit. Never let the element of a personal challenge enter into your decision. You should stop any chase when the risks of exposing you and/or the public to unnecessary dangers are high or the environmental conditions show the futility of continued pursuit.

**6.8. (Added-AFRC) Mutual Aid Agreements.** Installation chiefs of security forces should establish, in writing, formal mutual aid agreements regarding assistance to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies as well as the assistance civilian agencies provide to the installation. Mutual aid agreements consider assistance to the installation from civilian Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT)

or Emergency Services Team (EST) type teams, detection dog teams, etc. Coordinate agreements with the installation staff judge advocate.

## Chapter 7

### APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND CUSTODY

**7.1. Apprehension On Military Installations.** You may apprehend any person subject to the UCMJ if you have a reasonable belief the person being apprehended has engaged or is engaging in criminal activity.

7.1.1. A reasonable belief is a belief based on the kind of reliable information that a reasonable, prudent person would rely on, which makes it more likely than not that something is true (RCM, Rule 302(c)).

7.1.2. Title 18, United States Code, and the US Constitution authorize the detention of civilians for offenses committed on a military installation. Since civilians are not normally subject to the UCMJ, refer civilian violators to a US Magistrate for judicial disposition or to the local civil authorities having jurisdiction.

7.1.3. Installation CSP, with the advice of installation SJA, will establish local procedures for handling civilian offenders.

7.1.4. For minor offenses, release civilian offenders to a relative or friend, or release on their own recognizance.

7.1.5. The installation commander or appointed magistrate authorizes apprehensions in private dwellings.

7.1.5.1. Use AF Form 3226, **Authority to Apprehend in a Private Dwelling**, to document this authority.

**7.2. Off Installation Patrols.** Security police performing patrol duties off the installation have the authority to apprehend military personnel. However, a civilian police officer should identify all suspected military violators in civilian clothing. Develop policies and procedures for patrol activity conducted off installation in consultation with local civilian law enforcement officials and the staff judge advocate.

7.2.1. Overseas. The installation commander may authorize off installation patrols. Coordinate with the MAJCOM Staff Judge Advocate before authorizing off installation patrols. Security police maintain the authority to apprehend military personnel on or off the installation in an overseas environment. The authority to detain civilians on a US military installation varies in each host nation. Bilateral agreements and directives must specify such limitations.

**7.3. Custody.** Custody is the restraint of free movement. An apprehension occurs when a security policeman tells a suspect they are under apprehension. Once apprehended and in the custody of the person who affected the apprehension, security police control the movements of an offender. Protect the health and welfare of all apprehended suspects.

**7.4. Searches.** Immediately upon apprehending a suspect, conduct a search or a simple frisk of the suspect for weapons and any evidence that the suspect could remove or destroy. This emphasizes the safety of the security police and the apprehended individual. The apprehending security police person makes the decision to frisk (without handcuffs) or to search (handcuffed). Base this decision on the situation at hand. The situation may also warrant a search of the area under the suspect's control.

**7.5. Rights Advisement.** Advise suspects of their right against self-incrimination according to the UCMJ, Article 31 (military personnel), or the US Constitution, Fifth Amendment (civilian personnel). Use the AFVA 125-19, **Advisement of Rights**, for verbal advisement (usually on-scene), or the AF Form 1168, **Statement of Suspect/Witness**, for documented proof of rights advisement (usually prior to taking a written statement).

**7.5. (AFRC)** Provide copies of these forms to unit commanders and first sergeants as needed.

**7.6. Use of Force.** Comply with AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*, during apprehension and detention of suspects. Always use the minimum force necessary when placing a suspect under apprehension. Use handcuffs, chemical irritant projectors, batons, and firearms only when specifically trained in their use. In addition, you must strictly adhere to USAF standardized employment procedures.

**7.6. (AFRC)** The Executive Secretary of the Air Force Non-Nuclear Munitions Safety Board (NNMSB) certified the use of the CAP-STUN weapon system model Z-305 on 19 Apr 94, certification log number 94-4-3. Officers who carry a chemical irritant must be trained in its use. No other type or brand of chemical irritant may be used. The NNMSB imposed the following restrictions: The model Z-305 weapon shall not be exposed to temperatures above 120 degrees Fahrenheit (do not leave in vehicles). The model Z-305 weapon shall not be carried or otherwise transported aboard USAF aircraft engaged in flight operations.

7.6.1. Handcuffs. The courts consider handcuffing a use of force; therefore, you must carefully analyze each situation to ensure you use the minimum level of force to protect yourself and others from injury. During an apprehension, security police may apply handcuffs to ensure control of the apprehended individual during detention and search, at the apprehension site, and during transport. When applying handcuffs, security police use a reasonable level of force to achieve control of a resisting detainee. Inform unresisting detainees of the handcuffing procedure and give them the opportunity to cooperate. Use handcuffs as a precaution against an apprehended person who may become uncooperative or violent, to prevent escape, or to ensure personal safety.

**7.6.1. (AFRC)** Carefully weigh all factors before deciding to handcuff a suspect/subject during apprehension. Apprehension should not automatically warrant handcuffing.

7.6.2. Chemical and Inflammatory Agents. Use authorized chemical agents like mace and inflammatory agents such as pepper spray as an intermediate level use of force within the United States and its territories and possessions.

7.6.3. Police Club and Riot Baton. The installation CSP, with consent of the installation commander, determines the need and use of the police club and riot baton. If the CSP decides to authorize the use of the police club, the following guidelines apply:

**7.6.3. (AFRC)** If used, provide annual training on methods, handling, and use of force. Ensure applicable state requirements are met. Coordinate training plans with local staff judge advocate.

7.6.3.1. Do not use the PR-24 police baton.

7.6.3.2. Under ordinary circumstances, do not wear the baton while community policing; only carry it when conducting traffic stops or responding to incidents where its use would be likely.

7.6.3.3. If the CSP considers the police club necessary for normal wear, then consider the unobtrusive, collapsible type.

7.6.4. Firearms. You routinely bear firearms in the performance of your duties. AFI 31-207 contains specific criterion for their authorization and use. When responding to an incident where you may meet an armed adversary, place your firearm at the ready position. You may go to raised pistol when you deem its use to be imminent. Use realistic and safe exercises to develop the sound judgment required in situations that may involve the use of deadly force. Supervisors and exercise participants must follow the safety considerations outlined in AFI 31-207.

**7.7. Transporting Apprehended or Detained Persons.** Search or frisk all persons in custody for weapons before placing them in a security police vehicle and transporting them. Always use installed seatbelts.

7.7.1. When transporting a suspect, notify your respective control center of the departure time and destination arrival time (along with odometer readings) for inclusion in the desk blotter.

## Chapter 8

### SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND EVIDENCE

**8.1. Search.** A search is an examination of a person, property, or premise to uncover evidence of a crime or criminal intent (e.g., stolen goods, burglary tools, weapons, etc). Security police conduct searches of persons, property, or areas within jurisdictional limitations. Evidence obtained in an illegal search is inadmissible at a court-martial or other legal proceedings.

**8.2. Probable Cause Search.** Probable cause or reasonable grounds for a search are circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe a specific offense has occurred, that a specific person committed the offense, and that the fruits or instruments of the offense are in a specific place.

8.2.1. The special courts-martial convening authority at each installation may appoint a military magistrate to authorize probable-cause searches. Have the installation commander sign the appointment, and specify the installation over which the magistrate has authority. Security police will obtain the installation commander's (or appointed military magistrate's) permission to conduct a probable-cause search. Use AF Form 1176, **Authority to Search and Seize**, to document this action.

8.2.2. Most searches require probable cause (reasonable grounds) or consent to be valid. There are unique situations where you do not need probable cause such as when entering certain controlled access or restricted areas.

8.2.3. When justified, the manner and extent of the search are commensurate with the reason for the search.

8.2.4. Normally, you don't conduct a probable cause search based solely on the statement of one individual. However, if there are reasons why that individual is particularly trustworthy or reliable, the search authority may authorize a search. A search authorization request for such searches must detail why you consider the person trustworthy or reliable.

**8.3. Search Incident to Apprehension.** You may conduct a search incident to an apprehension without obtaining search authority and may include the immediate area over which the apprehended person exercises control. When conducting a search incident to an apprehension, you should conduct it immediately.

**8.4. Search With Consent.** Security police may conduct a search based on consent to search. If a person consents to a search of his or her property or person, you do not need search authority. When you obtain consent to search, the individual giving consent must give it freely and voluntarily. The law does not require the advisement of Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights to persons who voluntarily give permission for a search.

8.4.1. You may obtain consent orally or in writing. Use AF Form 1364, **Consent for Search and Seizure**, to obtain written consent to search.

8.4.2. The law may require rights advisement before, during, or after requesting or receiving consent to a search, depending upon if and when the individual becomes a "suspect" and the particular investigative circumstances.

**8.5. Search of and by the Opposite Sex.** Searching members of the opposite sex and premises occupied by members of the opposite sex is sensitive. Take certain precautions; carefully consider your actions and use common sense.

8.5.1. You may search outer garments (e.g., jackets, coats, etc.) and hand carried items of a member of the opposite sex.

8.5.2. Regardless of the sex of the person being searched, conduct frisks in the same manner. Security police or other military persons of the same sex conduct the frisk unless an urgent safety or security need exists. Two security police must be present to witness a frisk conducted by the opposite sex.

8.5.3. You may conduct a search of premises exclusively occupied by members of the opposite sex. However, security police or military personnel of the same sex as the occupants of the premises should be present during the search.

8.5.4. You will not conduct body searches of personnel of the opposite sex. If such searches are necessary, security police or other military persons of the same sex as the person searched will conduct the search.

**8.6. Personnel Searches.** There are four types of personnel searches used within the Air Force. In each case, the situation determines the type of search.

8.6.1. Use the standing search primarily for suspects who do not appear dangerous, violent, or so drugged or drunk they cannot stand under their own power.

8.6.2. Use the kneeling search when there is a considerable size difference between the searcher and suspect, or when there is a chance the suspect will become aggressive or violent.

8.6.3. Use the prone search when a suspect is aggressive or so physically or mentally impaired that the standing or kneeling search could cause injury to the suspect. This search is ideal for multiple apprehensions and is the primary search used during "high risk" operations.

8.6.4. Use the complete search, also known as the "strip search" only when placing a person into confinement or when ordered by appropriate authority. Health care providers should supervise complete searches.

**8.7. Off-Installation Searches.** Comply with local, state, and federal law if you need to conduct off-installation searches of a person subject to the UCMJ, or their property.

8.7.1. The installation commander approves any requests for such searches. Seek the advice of the installation SJA.

**8.8. Searches Outside the United States, US Commonwealths, and US Territories.** Authority for conducting search and seizure operations outside US federal jurisdiction varies according to geographic locations and US and host nation agreements. Consult with the local staff judge advocate before conducting off installation searches conducted outside the United States, US Commonwealths, and US Territories.

**8.9. Searches Conducted by Foreign Nationals.** Command may not delegate the general authority to order or to conduct searches to a foreign national. When making a lawful apprehension, host-nation contract security police may search the suspect's person, clothing worn, and the property in the suspect's



immediate possession. Host nation contract security police may also search a motor vehicle that a suspect was operating or riding in as a passenger. Host-nation law or US and host-nation agreements govern other restrictions or authorizations.

**8.10. Entry Point Inspections and Searches.** Installation commanders may order security police to inspect all or a percentage of motor vehicles entering or leaving their installation (AFI 31-204, *USAF Traffic Control Program*). They may also authorize searches of specific motor vehicles in the same manner as premise searches.

**8.11. Preserving Evidence.** Preserve all evidence found on a person or at the scene of an offense for use at future judicial proceedings. Maintain the chain of evidence.

8.11.1. Record all circumstances surrounding the discovery of evidence (e.g., location of the discovery, date and time, witnesses present, etc). These notes provide facts for an incident report. Additionally, you may use these notes to testify in court. As a minimum, file a copy of the notes with the incident report. Retain your original notes.

8.11.2. Place your initials and the date on all evidence for later identification. Use care not to destroy the evidentiary value of the item through the careless marking of the item. Use envelopes, boxes, plastic bags, etc., to collect evidence. Exercise sound judgment to avoid damaging a valuable stolen item that you may eventually return to its owner.

8.11.3. Security police units must maintain the capability to store evidence. See AFI 31-206, *Security Police Investigations*, for evidence storage guidelines.

8.11.4. Maintain a complete "chain of custody" accounting of all personnel who handle evidence. Use AF Form 52, **Evidence Tag**, to preserve the chain of custody. In addition to the discovery location, mark the date, time, and initials of the security police person who discovered the evidence. Make sure this form contains a complete description of the evidence and the signature of each person handling the evidence. Annotate the presence of any witnesses.

8.11.5. Return all evidence items to their rightful owners upon final disposition of a case. Coordinate all releases of evidence with the staff judge advocate.

## Chapter 9

### AIR FORCE LAW ENFORCEMENT TERMINAL SYSTEM (AFLETS)

**9.1. Program Definition.** AFLETS is an access system to computerized civilian law enforcement data. It allows the prompt exchange of documented police information between security police and our civilian counterparts.

**9.2. Program Responsibilities.** The following agencies and personnel are responsible for various aspects of the AFLETS program:

9.2.1. HQ AFSPA/SPLE obtains the originating agency identifiers for each Air Force terminal and coordinates (as needed) with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Law Enforcement Terminal System (NLETS), State Terminal System (STS), and HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).

9.2.2. HQ AFOSI is the US Air Force executive agency for National Crime Information Center (NCIC) matters.

9.2.3. MAJCOMs ensure US Air Force installations in the same state, share systems, if practical, and fund system acquisition, installation, and support.

9.2.4. The installation CSP establishes the need for an AFLETS terminal.

**9.3. Acquiring and Installing AFLETS.** Before acquiring and installing an AFLETS at a base, the installation CSP:

9.3.1. Contacts the appropriate state system administrator and coordinates action required to become part of the state's system through a dedicated terminal.

9.3.2. Determines the initial cost of installation to include procurement of power conditioning and continuation interfacing equipment (PCCIE).

9.3.3. Determines recurring costs of terminal equipment.

9.3.4. Receives PCCIE guidance from the base civil engineer.

9.3.5. Coordinates local funding for servicing equipment with appropriate base agencies.

9.3.6. Coordinates with the base contracting officer to develop a service agreement.

9.3.7. Determines facility protection and environmental requirements to satisfy state requirements for terminal installation.

9.3.8. Furnishes the base civil engineer with the necessary building repairs or modification requirements to accommodate the AFLETS.

**9.4. Training.** The installation CSP:

9.4.1. Coordinates and establishes training requirements for local operators with the state terminal authorities.

9.4.2. Ensures training of selected persons in terminal operation.

9.4.3. Ensures only trained and qualified persons operate the terminal.

#### 9.4.4. Documents training records.

**9.5. Providing System Protection.** Restrict access to data to official use only. Users and serviced agencies follow the state and NCIC guidance on policies, procedures, formats, and codes required for entering records into the system.

**9.6. Criminal History Data.** Computerized criminal history (CCH) and interstate identification index (III) are in a federal system of records and controlled under the Privacy Act of 1974. Grant access to this data for valid law enforcement purposes on a case-by-case basis.

9.6.1. The installation CSP may authorize access to CCH and III on a case-by-case basis. Other than AFOSI, requests from outside the unit must be in writing, include the reason for the request, and require installation CSP approval. Disclose data according to AFI 37-132, *The Air Force Privacy Act Program*. Terminate operations for misuse of terminals.

9.6.2. Prohibit obtaining the CCH or III data from other sources except as authorized by the installation CSP.

9.6.3. Keep all requests on file for validation purposes. If validation records do not correspond with access-approval files, conduct an inquiry to resolve the difference.

**9.7. Validation System and Records Maintenance.** Validate all AFLETS entries into NCIC, III, or STS. The FBI or STS sends AFLETS records that require validation to the installation CSP. The installation CSP establishes a validation system that includes:

9.7.1. A security police desk blotter entry (AF Form 53), or an incident report (DD Form 1569) that reflects a theft or complaint and prepared by the installation where the offense occurred serves as source documents for entries.

9.7.2. Use a folder for AF Form 1597, **Air Force Law Enforcement Terminal System Documentation**, or NCIC-directed validation document from each agency receiving or using AFLETS service to maintain a list of all system entries.

9.7.3. The installation CSP must select a system terminal manager (STM) to supervise, train on, and control terminal operations. The STM uses available documentation to validate entries into the system.

**9.8. Agencies Receiving AFLETS Service.** Agencies receiving AFLETS service follow the written requirements and responsibilities provided by the terminal-owning CSP. Written requirements include training, physical protection, and validations.

## Chapter 10

### HIGH RISK SITUATIONS

**10.1. Lead Agency Concept.** Public Law 93-366 and several National Security Directives (NSDs) outline the management of US Government response to high-risk incidents on federal property or terrorist incidents against US citizens, facilities, and/or interests. These publications identify a lead agency for coordinating US Government actions to resolve both terrorist and high-risk incidents. Specifically, lead agency designations include:

10.1.1. The Department of State (DOS) for terrorist incidents outside US territory.

10.1.2. The Department of Justice (DOJ) for terrorist and high-risk incidents within US territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency within the DOJ for operational response to such incidents.

10.1.3. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for aircraft piracy within the special jurisdiction of the United States. This special jurisdiction includes all the airspace used for aircraft travel within the United States and its territories. The US Government vests the FAA with exclusive responsibility for the direction of law enforcement activity during a hijacking involving in-flight aircraft within the US. The FBI has jurisdiction when the aircraft is not in flight. If the hijacking occurs overseas, the host nation, in conjunction with the DOS and Department of Defense (DoD), manages intervention. For further information see AFI 13-207, *Preventing and Resisting Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking)*.

10.1.4. The Department of State. The DOS assumes lead agency responsibilities for managing terrorist incidents overseas involving US Government or military affiliated personnel, facilities, and materials.

10.1.5. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI is the lead US Government agency for investigating criminal acts committed against US Government offices and employees on US Government reservations including military installations or against US Government property. AFOSI is the lead Air Force agency responsible for criminal investigations on Air Force installations and serve as liaison with the FBI. The FBI also has the following responsibilities:

10.1.5.1. Maintains civilian counterterrorist capabilities for response to criminal or terrorist incidents within the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

10.1.5.2. Conducts assessments and evaluations of aviation security measures and procedures with the FAA.

10.1.6. The Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA is responsible for domestic airport security programs and provides substantial technical and policy advice on US Government international aviation security efforts. It also provides technical assistance to the international community to improve security at international airports serving passengers destined for the United States. The FAA is the lead agency for international terrorist incidents involving aircraft in flight. For purposes of assigning responsibility in these matters, "flight" begins when support personnel close and secure the aircraft door, and the aircraft is no longer dependent on ground service.

**10.2. On-Installation Incidents.** Although the DOJ is the lead agency designated for coordinating US Government actions to resolve terrorist and high-risk criminal incidents, installation commanders have

inherent authority to take reasonably necessary and lawful measures to maintain law and order on installations and to protect military personnel, facilities, and property. This authority also includes removing or denying installation access to those individuals who threaten the orderly administration of the installation.

10.2.1. Role of the Installation Commander. Installation commanders must provide for initial and immediate response to any incident occurring on the installation. Additionally, commanders must contain damage, protect property and personnel, and restore order. To perform these functions, commanders may order searches and seizures and take other reasonably necessary steps to maintain law and order.

10.2.2. Role of the FBI. The FBI works with and through AFOSI to coordinate criminal investigations on Air Force installations. If a service member is not a suspect in the incident, the FBI eventually assumes investigative responsibility for the incident and the DoJ will prosecute, if appropriate. At what point the FBI assumes operational control of an incident depends on the incident and previously executed agreements. Because commanders may never delegate or abrogate ultimate responsibility for protecting federal property, commanders may not permit the FBI to assume responsibility for these military interests unless directed to do so by competent authority. Commanders must allow the FBI to perform its lead role in reacting to terrorist incidents when these military interests are not prejudiced. For more information, see DoD 0-2000.12 H, *Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence*.

**10.3. Air Force Philosophy.** While installation commanders have the authority to handle certain high-risk incidents that are criminal in nature (that is, barricaded suspects), the Air Force philosophy is to fully comply with the lead agency concept by yielding to civilian authorities such as the FBI whenever possible. The primary Air Force goal in dealing with these high-risk situations is to prevent or minimize loss of life and property by **containment, negotiation, and referral** when necessary. Meet this goal best by working with AFOSI to develop a local memorandum of agreement with the FBI that includes provisions for the FBI's special teams to rehearse and train on the installation.

**10.4. Duties and Responsibilities.** Resolution of hostage incidents on federal property involves many agencies and personnel. Installation plans should identify the role of key base agencies in resolution of high risk incidents. Installation contingency plans must also address the use of security police to isolate, contain, and neutralize a terrorist or hostage incident, with or without FBI assistance. Contingency plans should address the use of installation security police, other military forces, and host nation resources. Installations on foreign soil must coordinate plans with host nation and the State Department (normally the Regional Security Officer of the US Embassy). In overseas situations, the status of forces or other agreements and understandings determines the use of host nation resources instead of US forces.

10.4.1. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs. The SAF/PA provides public affairs guidance and authorizes local responses to news media inquiries for hostage situations.

10.4.2. HQ USAF. HQ USAF/SP and IG develop policies and procedures for hostage situations.

10.4.3. Installation Commander. Installation commanders:

10.4.3.1. Prepare contingency plans and maintain a capability to counter hostage situations on their installations.

10.4.3.2. Organize, train, and equip base units to implement the plans.

10.4.3.3. Maintain responsibility for hostage situations until appropriate authority directs otherwise.

10.4.3.4. Determine the need for hostage negotiators and emergency service teams (EST).

10.4.3.5. Determine the response time based on the local threat.

10.4.3.6. Take immediate action as dictated by the situation to prevent loss of life or lessen property damage before the FBI response force arrives. If the FBI declines jurisdiction, the Air Force will act to resolve the incident.

10.4.4. The installation CSP is the primary advisor to the installation commander on hostage negotiations and EST employment.

10.4.5. AFOSI Detachment. The servicing AFOSI detachment is the Air Force liaison with all federal agencies on criminal investigations and will maintain close coordination with civil authorities to exchange information that could indicate a threat to individuals or property on a military installation. This office also provides investigative support within its capabilities when needed.

10.4.6. Local Law Enforcement. The role of state and local law enforcement agencies is much more difficult. Each installation establishes unique alliances in the form of jurisdictional agreements. Commanders, staff judge advocates, and chiefs of security police must become familiar with these local arrangements and comply with the negotiated policing protocols.

**10.5. Off-Installation Incidents.** The FBI is the lead federal agency for containing and resolving terrorist incidents occurring off the military installation. AFOSI maintains liaison with the FBI on terrorist incidents occurring off military installations that may impact Air Force operations. DoD Directive 5525.5, *DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, January 15, 1986, with Change 1*, greatly restricts the use of military forces to enforce civil laws of the US within the territory of the US. However, if military equipment, property, documents, or personnel are at risk, the commander is ultimately responsible for their protection. For example, in the case of an aircraft crash that occurs outside the confines of a military installation, the commander has the option of declaring an exclusive zone around the crash site known as a national defense area (NDA) to support his or her capacity to protect military equipment, property, documents or personnel.

10.5.1. National Defense Area (NDA). NDAs contain and secure federal government resources in the US and US territorial areas that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the DoD. The Air Force may need to establish an NDA if:

10.5.1.1. Aircraft divert to civilian airports.

10.5.1.2. An aircraft carrying nuclear weapons makes an emergency landing.

10.5.1.3. It is necessary to temporarily immobilize nuclear weapons ground convoys.

10.5.1.4. An aircraft crashes.

10.5.1.5. Other unplanned emergency occurs.

**10.6. Containment Policy.** It is both customary and usual for military commanders to assume responsibility for initial response, containment, and resolution of criminal incidents that occur on DoD facilities within the US, its territories, and its possessions. In fact, DoD installation military commanders and civil-

ian managers have responsibility and authority for initial response to contain and/or resolve criminal incidents on their installation.

10.6.1. Investigations. The FBI is the lead agency for investigation and prosecution of alleged violations of the US Code (USC) that occur on DoD installations or within DoD facilities. In addition, the FBI is the lead agency for investigation and prosecution of individuals alleged to have violated the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 by committing prohibited acts against Americans abroad. Thus, it is the FBI's responsibility to investigate those incidents the installation commander declares "terrorist" in nature. AFOSI remains the Air Force liaison with the FBI and should be notified any time assistance from the FBI may be required.

10.6.2. Beyond Containment. Given the FBI's pervasive role in leading the US government's response to terrorist incidents, investigation of USC violations, and their investigative role when prohibited acts are committed abroad, the preferred solution to any high-risk situation is to respond and contain the incident until FBI contact is made. Installation commanders may choose to establish and train security police as emergency service teams to handle a wide range of high risk situations. If commanders decide to pursue this option, they must seek specialized training from the FBI, local law enforcement agencies, or other branches of the service.

10.6.2.1. US Army Course. The Army's two-week Special Reaction Team (SRT) Course, # 7H-F17/830-F12, offered numerous times annually at Ft McClellan, provides excellent training for teams designed to handle high-risk situations. If units decide to use this course to train their emergency service teams, they must comply with Army fitness standards and provide funding for attendance by team members. The Army also teaches this course through the use of mobile training teams (MTT) that travel to installations requesting such services. This may be the best option as these MTTs emphasize training designed specifically for the host installation. The installation provides all funding.

## Chapter 11

### EMERGENCY SERVICE TEAMS (EST)

**11.1. Requirements for EST.** The installation commander may establish and maintain an EST. The formation of emergency service teams is an optional program established at the discretion of the installation commander. The basic unit is a four-person security police team acting as a single tactical police team or in conjunction with other teams during high-risk operations. These include, but are not limited to, anti-sniper actions, barricaded suspect neutralization, hostage rescue, counterterrorist tactics, and special event operations. The basic premise for the use of EST is that a tactical team of highly motivated and well-conditioned police, specially trained and equipped to function as a team, is more effectively and safely employed than a larger group of security police. The USAF's primary objective in dealing with high-risk situations is to prevent or minimize the loss of life or property by containment, negotiation, and yielding to the expertise and unique training of civilian authorities like the FBI and the FAA when possible.

**11.2. Goals.** Generally, the goal of any high-risk situation requiring EST employment should include the release of hostages unharmed, protection of bystanders, prevention of injury to responding forces, apprehension of suspects unharmed, and restoration of normal operations. These appear in no certain order and their prioritization may change depending on the nature of each situation. Tasks associated with initial response include crisis point and location identification, site isolation, evacuation of nonessential personnel, establishment of an inner perimeter, and conducting a reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission.

**11.3. Capability.** Each installation should have the ability to contain potential hostage, sniper, barricaded suspect situations, and acts of terrorism, and to provide a standby force to support special events. If command desires a preselected and highly trained team, assignment to these teams should be voluntary as units receive no additional manpower for this activity. The volunteer nature of their members often determines the effectiveness and success of specialized teams. While designed as stand-alone teams, ESTs must remain capable of teaming up with other teams and element personnel as situations warrant. Team positions include:

11.3.1. Team Leader. Responsible for primary direction of the operations and team control during deployment.

11.3.2. Marksman. Provides selected firepower at an individual or location. For obvious reasons, this member should possess the sharpest shooting skills and highest level of concentration.

11.3.3. Point Member. Guides the team's movement during search and clear operations. Acts as the reconnaissance component within the search element. Select a quick thinking individual who can maintain composure under stressful conditions.

11.3.4. Defense Member. Provides close protection for the team during movement and deployment.

**11.4. Assignment.** Units with an assigned EST should ensure that team training is a top priority. Lessons learned from high-risk situations like the Waco, TX incident clearly demonstrate the hazards of employing part-time special operations personnel in a difficult, large scale operation. If feasible, CSPs should consider consolidating EST members on a similar daily working element, to promote teamwork and camaraderie. The more time members spend together, the more effective they will become as an



EST. Additionally, well planned, expertly controlled operations have a better chance to succeed than operations conceived in an ad hoc fashion by people who may never have worked together.

**11.5. Emergency Medical Skills.** Planning for a high-risk or tactical mission should obviously include concern for medical care. Units deciding to establish an EST should also establish a tactical emergency medical support program.

**11.6. Intelligence.** One of the recognized basic principles of intelligence is that tactical operations and intelligence are interdependent. Intelligence does not exist for its own sake, but to assist in executing operational missions. Develop and nurture the capacity to gather tactical intelligence. Seek assistance and planning support from your local Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).

**11.7. Interagency Cooperation.** Meet regularly with counterparts from other federal agencies. Conduct meetings at least annually with federal special operations leaders and command personnel (BATF, FBI, Marshals Service, and Customs) to discuss tactical analysis and contemporary procedures. Emphasize the necessity for interagency cooperation and training. Periodically include guest speakers from civilian law enforcement teams so attendees can share their experience and expertise.

**11.8. Employment.** Employ the EST as required to resolve situations where loss of life appears imminent. Other considerations include:

11.8.1. The CSP maintains functional control of emergency service teams. The installation commander or designated representative directs the decision to assault.

11.8.2. Don't use specialized teams in conjunction with civil disturbances and protest demonstrations, unless intelligence indicates the potential for violence.

11.8.3. Consider using the EST during open house functions. Keep the EST out of sight until actually deployed.

**11.9. Uniforms and Equipment.** Procure the basic equipment authorized for EST through supply channels. For standardization, the battle dress uniform (BDU) is the accepted uniform. Use approved equipment listed in TA 538.

**11.10. Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT).** The principal method to resolve hostage situations is through negotiation by the HNT. Hostage negotiation is not necessarily a security police-unique responsibility, but the HNT may include trained security police. Seek local training for negotiators. The US Army offers the following course at Ft McClellan, Alabama: Hostage Negotiation, # L5AZA3PO72 002, PDS Code 9S0.

11.10.1. EST Relationship with the HNT. EST members do not participate in or influence negotiations. They may, however, pass information to the HNT regarding the hostage taker. If you deploy the EST, the HNT may assist by creating a diversion.

11.10.2. Nonnegotiable Demands. Nonnegotiable demands include:

11.10.2.1. Access or continued access to a nuclear weapon.

11.10.2.2. Release of inmates.

11.10.2.3. Weapons, ammunition, or explosives.

11.10.2.4. Absolute promises of amnesty.

11.10.2.5. Security police or AFOSI radios.

11.10.2.6. Tactically significant information.

11.10.2.7. The exchange of security police, AFOSI, other law enforcement persons, or high-ranking officials for hostages.

**NOTE:**

Demands for alcohol, narcotics, or other drugs are nonnegotiable unless the demand is reasonable or for the health of an injured or sick hostage. Because of the dangers involved, avoid the exchange of any hostages.

**11.11. Planning Considerations.** Preplanning and coordination with other base agencies are important to successful resolutions to situations. Preplanning actions include:

11.11.1. Acquisition of base maps and high-risk structure floor plans.

11.11.2. Coordination with AFOSI for technical surveillance and other services.

11.11.3. Coordination with local FBI and law enforcement for special services.

11.11.4. Coordination with base communications personnel for equipment.

11.11.5. Coordination with the base civil engineer and civilian utility companies for control of utilities.

**11.12. Initial EST Training.** Installation commanders choosing to establish an EST must seek initial training and certification for all team members. As described in paragraph 10.6.2.1, the Army's SRT course, either in residence or through the use of an MTT, is an excellent source for initial EST training. Subjects vary from building entry and tactics to firearms training, trauma aid, operational planning, and physical conditioning. Installation commanders may also seek this type of specialized training from the FBI or from local law enforcement.

11.12.1. Sustainment. The sophistication and perishable nature of skills necessary to perform effectively within the contemporary tactical environment of high risk situations require allocation of optimum time for their maintenance. Following a basic training and certification program, each EST should train regularly to remain proficient. Suggested training topics include:

11.12.1.1. Integration of hostage negotiations, EMS, and forward observer (marksman) capabilities.

11.12.1.2. Forward observer training--observation and recording skills; establishment of a command and control mechanism for forward observer/marksman.

11.12.1.3. Intelligence operations to include management, analysis, and intelligence support of tactical operations.

11.12.1.4. Performance-oriented team leader/member skills.

11.12.1.5. Physical fitness.

11.12.1.6. Individual and small group training activities to include periodic exercises to hone and evaluate preparedness.

**11.13. Military Working Dog (MWD) Team Use.** If you use MWDs with the EST, they must take part in normal EST training. Do not use MWDs on an assault when there are hostages or multiple subjects. Immediately follow any MWD entry with an EST assault. In this situation, the MWD handler must be EST trained and must remain with the entry team to control the dog.

**11.14. Reporting Requirements.** Initially report all incidents through OPREP-3 (See AFI 10-601) reporting channels. The installation CSP provides a security police lessons learned report, as outlined in Chapter 13, of any actual employment of EST.

11.14.1. Follow-up Reports. The installation or on-scene commander submits as necessary to keep command authorities informed.

## Chapter 12

### CRIME PREVENTION

**12.1. Definition.** Crime prevention is a pattern of attitudes and behaviors directed both at reducing the threat of crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security to improve the quality of life in our society and help develop environments where crime cannot flourish.

12.1.1. **The Air Force Vision.** The goal of the Air Force crime prevention program is to eliminate or minimize the opportunity and desire to engage in criminal activities. Prevention and elimination of crime are quality of life issues, especially considering recent downsizing in the Air Force. Crime prevention is more than a single focus, law enforcement effort. Effective crime prevention requires interaction among commanders, staff personnel, officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), airmen, civilian employees, and dependents.

**12.2. Objectives.** To have an effective program, clearly delineate and widely publicize program objectives. Installation commanders and CSPs may add other objectives to meet local conditions, but the three principal objectives are:

12.2.1. Upgrade the protection of personnel and property by educating people to recognize and avoid situations in which they are likely to end up the victim of an assault or robbery; encourage the installation to install better locks; stress the need for consistent use of existing locks and safeguards.

12.2.2. Increase surveillance within the Air Force community by encouraging those in charge of quarters and residents to challenge unidentified individuals in dormitory and housing areas; establish neighborhood watch programs; encourage permanent marking of property.

12.2.3. Achieve maximum involvement of the Air Force community and security police in crime prevention activities.

12.2.4. **Acceptance.** Voluntary acceptance of the above objective depends on convincing members of the base community of the need to protect themselves, their neighborhoods, and work areas by supporting crime prevention goals.

**12.3. The Resources Protection Connection.** The Air Force Crime Prevention Program, by design, complements and works with AFI 31-209, *The Air Force Resources Protection Program*. Achieve the goals of both programs through active participation of the total Air Force community.

**12.4. Role of Security Police.** The role of security police, though pivotal in effective crime prevention and resources protection programming, is that of an educational, technical, and supportive resource--an "enabler or catalyst" rather than a "doer." The primary role of security police law enforcement is that of preventive patrol, armed response, detection, and investigative services. Security police also provide equally important technical services such as physical security and resources protection. Obviously, they need to achieve proficiency in prevention and resources protection programs.

12.4.1. **Program Manager.** After a careful evaluation of the need for an installation crime prevention program, the CSP selects an individual to manage the program. The objective wing security police squadron structure does not contain a funded manpower authorization for crime prevention; therefore, this is not a mandatory program. If they decide to implement a crime prevention program, CSPs may

choose to have the resources protection program manager also administer the crime prevention program. CSPs are free to choose other options based on the local environment and needs of the unit.

12.4.2. Considerations. Personnel selected for these positions should possess the ability to communicate, have the flexibility to work with both young and mature groups, and be willing to work varied hours. The person selected to perform crime prevention duties maintains direct communication with law enforcement shifts, investigations, and reports and analysis, and should have operations and command accessibility.

12.4.3. Program Responsibilities. The following is a list of the types of crime prevention services the crime prevention program manager may choose to provide for the installation:

12.4.3.1. Establish base-level crime prevention programs. Includes assessing needs, identifying problems, establishing objectives, coordinating training, and managing program implementation. It further includes providing continuing analysis, program revision, and community-wide crime prevention consultation services.

12.4.3.2. Use criminal statistical data provided by security police reports and analysis to examine prevailing crime patterns. Use analyzed data to determine employment of appropriate crime-risk management systems as well as short- and long-term crime prevention strategies to counter local crime problems.

12.4.3.3. Provide crime trend data to unit commanders, law enforcement activities, and other interested base agencies. Security police use this information to determine selective enforcement techniques and element-level crime prevention techniques.

12.4.3.4. Develop and implement a media campaign to publicize the base crime prevention program, prevailing crime problems, and effective measures to counter these problems.

12.4.3.5. Conduct and coordinate speaking engagements to promote crime prevention goals. Use commander's calls, first sergeant meetings, social activities, youth gatherings, wives' club meetings, school visitations, etc.

12.4.3.6. Participate in community projects that foster joint police and community efforts; for example, Operation Identification, neighborhood watch, crime stop, and crime hazard reporting. Determine the effectiveness of each program.

12.4.3.7. Conduct citizen awareness programs that educate the military community on the crime risks they face. Emphasize specific problems and precautions to protect themselves and their property.

12.4.3.8. Provide crime prevention statistics, rates, and trend analysis to members of the installation's Resources Protection Executive Committee (RPEC). Implement programs identified by the RPEC.

12.4.3.9. Assist in formulating youth activity programs and selecting volunteers to act as youth leaders and advisors in youth programs like the Law Enforcement Explorers. Provide crime prevention training to youth groups. For example, the Boy Scouts of America recently added a crime prevention merit badge that may require assistance from the crime prevention program manager.

12.4.3.10. Conduct on-base residential, dormitory, and work area crime prevention surveys for occupants and organizations requesting such service.

12.4.3.11. Request and maintain adequate stock of crime prevention literature and forms to ensure the continuous availability of material to promote crime prevention programs.

12.4.3.12. Maintain close liaison with civilian organizations and authorities on crime prevention programs. Where possible, set up joint programs to promote military and civilian community involvement and combat mutual crime problems. Participate in local, state, and federal crime prevention activities that benefit the military community.

12.4.3.13. Encourage unit commanders to establish crime prevention programs within their unit and suggest they designate a focal point to coordinate program activities within the unit.

**12.5. Basic Programs.** As a primary source of information on crime patterns, security police should provide guidance to the community on prevailing kinds of crime and the specific mode of operation used by criminals. Each base has its own unique community environment with its own set of crime prevention needs. For instance, when a base is in a high crime area or has a high crime rate, it should develop an aggressive program of crime prevention tailored to the situation and environment. There are, however, some basic programs designed to prevent the most prevalent types of crime occurring on Air Force bases. These successful programs include:

12.5.1. Operation Crime Stop. One essential crime prevention program is the prompt and accurate reporting of imminent crime situations or criminal acts. Some people will report their observations to police only when they know they can remain anonymous. Operation Crime Stop helps overcome reluctance to become involved with security police by providing a single telephone line for crime reporting while allowing witnesses to remain anonymous.

12.5.1.1. Install a dedicated Crime Stop telephone, capable of receiving calls from both on and off base at the law enforcement desk. Set up a single number dedicated to Crime Stop reporting. Advertise the purpose of the dedicated line and the ability to remain anonymous. Distribute Crime Stop reporting materials to other unit personnel and encourage their support of the program. Bases having on-line access to either 911 or Enhanced 911 (E911 provides automatic caller ID) Emergency Reporting Systems may elect to use that system instead.

12.5.1.2. Log each Crime Stop call on an AF Form 53, **Security Police Desk Blotter**. Begin each entry with "Crime Stop" to aid in statistical retrieval.

12.5.2. Operation Identification. The Operation Identification program, referred to by the logo "OPID", is a crime resistance technique which individuals employ to deter burglaries and larcenies. It also provides investigative leads that increase the chances of solving crimes. OPID encourages owners of high value, theft attractive, or highly pilferable property to permanently mark their property with an identifying number. This numbering system provides a means of positively identifying the property and to establish ownership if there is theft or loss. Use the social security number plus the service prefix (AF) as it is the most flexible and recognizable identifier for worldwide implementation.

12.5.2.1. Mark the property by engraving, etching, or by using fluorescent marking devices. Photograph property not easily marked like rings, watches, silverware, etc. Security police should maintain one or more electric engravers or other appropriate marking devices at the law enforcement desk for checkout by interested personnel.

12.5.3. Crime Hazard Identification Program. One goal of crime prevention is to identify, report, and eliminate as many crime hazards as possible, and thus reduce the opportunity for crime. Security

police and base-level crime prevention program managers may solicit and issue them to commanders and agency chiefs for corrective actions.

12.5.3.1. **Crime Hazard Reminder.** Security police should leave crime hazard reminders when they discover insecure vehicles, office areas, equipment, or unattended property.

12.5.4. **Citizen Awareness Program.** The thrust of this program is to educate the base community through the base newspapers and other media about the typical crimes, victims, and offenders. Additionally, the installation crime prevention program manager may brief all newly assigned personnel on the local crime program with an emphasis on precautions that base personnel should take to avoid becoming victims of crime.

12.5.4.1. **Military Working Dogs.** The fact MWDs are present on the base is, within itself, a deterrent to crime. Articles in the local news media announcing their presence and capabilities serve to increase public awareness and acceptance. While media coverage does bolster public awareness, you should exercise caution when publishing precise details. For instance, refrain from publishing or glorifying seizures by drug detector dog teams as this type of notoriety places the handler at risk for retaliation.

12.5.5. **Selective Enforcement.** Selective enforcement provides for a more efficient use of manpower and lends direction to the prevention of crime and law enforcement activities. The basis for selective enforcement is accurate historical data as to time, place, type, and frequency of incidents or violations. The crime prevention program manager tabulates information in complaint reports, vehicle accident reports, and offense reports. Properly file this data for easy retrieval. Study each complaint or offense looking for underlying conditions or acts that usually continue to cause trouble unless corrected. An analysis of data accumulated over time should indicate the nature of the enforcement problem and the need for selective assignment of security police. Crime prevention program managers provide their analysis to the operations flight leadership for patrol activity consideration.

12.5.5.1. An effective application of selective enforcement is its use in traffic supervision. For example, analysis of a series of accidents at an intersection will help determine causes. Perhaps a traffic signal, trimming of shrubbery, stop sign, or speed limit reduction sign will help reduce the frequency of accidents. Repeated reports of speeding may require a speed measuring device along with a marked security police vehicle.

12.5.6. **Physical Protection Surveys.** Security police units may establish a program to offer physical protection surveys to residents of base housing, dormitories, and to supervisors of activities not normally inspected or surveyed under the resources protection program. The purpose of these surveys is to educate personnel about the steps they can take to protect themselves and their property. The survey is a critical analysis of the physical protection of the quarters, dormitories, or work areas involved. Schedule surveys for the requesting individual based on available manpower. Coordinate surveys with AFOSI when done as part of the anti-terrorism or Force Protection program. When feasible, the crime prevention program manager should consider using law enforcement specialists who normally patrol the neighborhood or area to help conduct physical security surveys.

**12.6. Situational Crime Prevention.** As noted above, the most effective crime prevention programs address the local crime situation and use local AFOSI expertise in facilities and personnel protection. Not all the techniques listed above are appropriate for every Air Force base. Consequently, the support group commander and the chief of security police should analyze their crime problem before deciding which, if

any, of these programs to adopt. It's beyond the scope of this instruction to provide crime prevention strategies for every situation an installation may face.

12.6.1. The Crime Prevention Coalition. This coalition is a nonpartisan group of more than 120 national, state, and federal organizations united to encourage action by individuals and groups to prevent crime. Established in 1980, this coalition provides support for the National Citizens' Crime Prevention Campaign. The USAF is one of the original members of this broad-based, interdisciplinary group whose members represent youth development organizations, municipalities, health care providers, law enforcement, and federal and state organizations, to name a few.

12.6.2. National Crime Prevention Council. (NCPC). Formed in 1982 as a nonprofit organization, the NCPC acts as an advocate for crime prevention policies and programs throughout the nation. The NCPC works as secretariat to the Crime Prevention Coalition by managing its day-to-day activities. Its mission is to enable people to prevent crime and build safer communities. The NCPC is also the focal point for the nation's crime prevention efforts. The National Citizens' Crime Prevention Campaign-symbolized by McGruff and the "Take a Bite Out of Crime" slogan-operates through a unique partnership among the NCPC, the Advertising Council, Inc., and the Crime Prevention Coalition. NCPC manages the day-to-day activities of the public service advertising campaign by providing the following services to coalition members:

12.6.2.1. Develops materials, including posters, brochures, and books that help teach crime prevention skills to citizens of all ages.

12.6.2.2. Provides information, referral services, and technical assistance to people trying to enhance a crime prevention effort.

12.6.2.3. Conducts training in crime prevention skills and techniques.

12.6.2.4. Establishes demonstration programs and practical research to find the most effective ways to prevent crime.

12.6.3. NCPC granted authorization to the USAF to reproduce NCPC-copyrighted material. You may adopt elements of the national program to meet local needs. For further information, contact the National Crime Prevention Council, Coalition and State Services Unit, 1700 K. Street NW, Second Floor, Washington, DC 20006-3817. The phone number is 202-466-6272, Ext. 126; fax: 202-296-1356.



## Chapter 13

### SECURITY POLICE LESSONS LEARNED

**13.1. Purpose.** The security police lessons learned is a living document striving to capture the experiences of past significant events in the security police career field. Its purpose is to educate and train our forces. Training and operations planners and leaders at every level can use the examples to focus and guide programs. Commanders and operations staffs can review them with an eye toward local procedural policy, both written and unwritten. Element leaders can use them for motivation and training. Most importantly, the law enforcement and security men and women performing the front line duty can look inward and reflect on their actions in situations they may potentially face.

13.1.1. The focus of lessons learned concentrates on the worker level so that they can interpret and apply lessons learned directly to the field.

**13.2. Categories.** Lessons learned is divided into several categories for quick access and retrieval. The specific sections and a brief description of the types of incidents contained therein include:

13.2.1. Shooting Incidents. Any peacetime government firearms discharge meeting the reporting requirements outlined in AFI 31-207, *Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel*. Report all instances where security police use deadly force in the performance of their duties.

13.2.2. Security Incidents. This category includes, but is not limited to security incidents, Helping Hand/Covered Wagon incidents, Dull Sword incidents, unlawful entry to aircraft, sabotage or attempted sabotage to AF aircraft, any breach of aircraft security, acts of vandalism directed at AF priority resources, unauthorized entry into a restricted area, hijacking or attempts, unauthorized entry into a launch facility (LF), significant security incidents at AF sponsored air shows, and any damage to aircraft.

13.2.3. Deployments (Actual/Exercise). Examples of lessons learned from previous deployments includes: Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, migrant camp operations in Guantanamo and Panama, and PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey.

13.2.4. Law Enforcement Incidents. Actual employment of EST, regardless of the outcome. Robberies or attempted robberies, especially if they involve weapons, munitions, or large sums of money.

13.2.5. Military Corrections Incidents Inmate escapes and inmate disturbances or riots.

13.2.6. Information/Industrial Security Incidents. Summaries of major espionage cases like the Aldrich Ames case, independent research on insider threats, and substantiated cases of industrial espionage/sabotage.

13.2.7. Terrorist Acts. Terrorist attacks at an Air Force base or its resources, bombings/rocket attacks, and significant threats from known terrorist groups.

13.2.8. Civil Disturbances. Protest activity or demonstrations at AF installations, military operations other than war (MOOTW), like peacekeeping operations that lead to civil unrest, migrant camp operations and disaster relief missions resulting in mass crowd violence or disorder.

13.2.9. Military Working Dog (MWD) Incidents. All unauthorized bites by MWDs, destruction of property by MWDs, training aid losses.

13.2.10. Combat Arms Training & Maintenance (CAM) Incidents. Unusual training incidents like n

M-60 "cook-off" or explosion of blank rounds, unexpected ricochets, and accidental weapons discharges.

13.2.11. Miscellaneous. This category provides an avenue for CSPs to analyze and report any incident that may be of educational value for the security police career field. Examples of the types of incidents previously reported in this section include domestic disturbance/loss of SP weapon, ABD training accident/death of SP, injury to an SP while making a DUI apprehension, and SP response to a potential suicide.

**13.3. Reporting Requirements.** Security police commanders analyze significant incidents, like those mentioned above, occurring on their installation. Submit a summary of the event, using the security police lessons learned format in attachment 4 of this AFI. Provide the final lessons learned product, within 60 days of the incident to HQ AFSPA/SPSS, 8601 F Avenue SE, Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5516.

**| 13.3. (AFRC)** Coordinate these reports through AFRC/SF prior to releasing to HQ AFSPA/SPSS.

## Chapter 14

### SECURITY POLICE FORMS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS

**14.1. AF Form 52, Evidence Tag.** Use this two-part form to record evidence and maintain a chain of custody.

**14.2. AF Form 53, Security Police Desk Blotter.** Use this form to record a chronology of security police activities during a shift.

**14.3. AF Form 110, Individual Incident Reference Record.** Reports and analysis staff use this form to record complaints, incidents, and offenses of individual military personnel, their dependents, Department of the Air Force civilians or contractors, or any person or organization considered as suspects in an incident. Maintain this form according to AFI 37-133V2.

**14.4. AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/ Complainant.** Use this form to take a written statement from a suspect or accused person, witness, or complainant.

**14.5. AF Form 1176, Authority to Search and Seize.** Use this form to obtain authorization to search and seize IAW with Chapter 8.

**14.6. AF Form 1313, Driver Record.** Use this form as a cumulative traffic record (driving history) for drivers who are principals in motor vehicle traffic accidents or moving traffic violations IAW AFI 31-204, *USAF Traffic Supervision Program*.

**14.7. AF Form 1315, Accident Report.** Use this form to record investigations of major traffic accidents (refer to AFI 31-204).

**14.8. AF Form 1361, Pick Up/Restriction Order.** Use this form to record facts and provide security police with information about pick-up orders or to place a restriction order on a military member.

**14.9. AF Form 1364, Consent for Search and Seizure.** Use this form to document when an individual consents freely and voluntarily to a search of his or her person or property.

**14.10. AF Form 1597, Air Force Law Enforcement Terminal System Documentation.** Use this form to annotate each input to a terminal system and to conduct validations.

**14.11. AF Form 3226, Authority to Apprehend in Private Dwelling.** Use this form when requiring authority to make an apprehension in a private on-base dwelling.

**14.12. DD Form 460, Provisional Pass.** Use this form to assist military members in returning to their unit.

**14.13. DD Forms 629 and 629 PA, Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person.** Use this form to transfer prisoners between confinement facilities or to release a detained person to his or her unit commander or representative.

**14.14. DD Form 1569, Incident/Complaint Report.** Use this form to record facts about an incident or complaint for the proper military authority. Include in the report all available facts, names of personnel involved, and a summary of the initial on-scene investigation. When completed, send the form to the security police administration flight for processing.

14.14.1. If the report concerns an Air Force member from another installation, send the report to the member's CSP.

14.14.2. If the report concerns a military member from another service or Coast Guard not assigned to the installation issuing the report, send the original report to the member's installation military police or shore patrol office and maintain a copy for the unit file. **NOTE:** Do not require a report of command action from the member's commander. However, this does not preclude the exchange of information from local service commanders. Should you desire an exchange, use a letter of transmittal or cover letter requesting information.

14.14.3. If the report concerns a civilian employee, retired military member, or military dependent, send the report as directed by local directives.

14.14.4. If the report concerns a civilian not affiliated with the military, send the report to the proper civilian law enforcement agency or US Magistrate for action according to local directives.

**14.15. Automated Forms.** Some security police forms are available in automated versions and are approved for use through the Security Police Automated System (SPAS) or PerForm Pro.

**14.16. Forms Prescribed:** AF Form 52, **Evidence Tag**

AF Form 53, **Security Police Desk Blotter**

AF Form 110, **Individual Incident Reference Record**

AF Form 1168, **Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complainant**

AF Form 1176, **Authority to Search and Seize**

AF Form 1315, **Accident Report**

AF Form 1361, **Pick Up/Restriction Order**

AF Form 1364, **Consent for Search and Seizure**

AF Form 1597, **Air Force Law Enforcement Terminal System Documentation**

DD Form 460, **Provisional Pass**

DD Forms 629 and 629 PA, **Receipt for Prisoner or Detained Person**

DD Form 1569, **Incident/Complaint Report**

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## **Attachment 1**

### **GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND TERMS**

#### ***Abbreviations and Acronyms***

**AFLETS**—Air Force Law Enforcement Terminal System  
**AFOSI**—Air Force Office of Special Investigations  
**AFSC**—Air Force Specialty Code  
**AFSPA**—Air Force Security Police Agency  
**ANG**—Air National Guard  
**BDU**—Battle Dress Uniform  
**CATM**—Combat Arms Training and Maintenance  
**CCH**—Computerized Criminal History  
**CLEA**—Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies  
**COMSEC**—Communications Security  
**CONUS**—Continental US  
**CPR**—Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation  
**CSP**—Chief of Security Police  
**DOS**—Department of State  
**EST**—Emergency Service Team  
**FBI**—Federal Bureau of Investigation  
**FCC**—Federal Communications Commission  
**HNT**—Hostage Negotiation Team  
**III**—Interstate Identification Index  
**LMR**—Land Mobile Radio  
**MAJCOM**—Major Command  
**MWD**—Military Working Dog  
**NCIC**—National Crime Information Center  
**NLETS**—National Law Enforcement Terminal System  
**OSHA**—Occupational Safety and Health Agency  
**PCCIE**—Power Conditioning and Continuation Interfacing Equipment  
**PKC**—Peacekeeper Challenge  
**RCM**—Rules for Court-Martial  
**SAF**—Secretary of the Air Force

**SP**—Security Police  
**SPAS**—Security Police Automated System  
**SSN**—Social Security Number  
**STM**—System Terminal Manager  
**STS**—State Terminal System  
**TA**—Table of Allowance  
**TO**—Technical Orders  
**UCMJ**—Uniform Code of Military Justice  
**USAFR**—US Air Force Reserve  
**USSS**—US Secret Service

*Terms*

**Apprehension** —The taking of a person into custody.

**Desk Blotter**—A 24 hour, chronological record of significant events during a security police tour of duty.

**Duress**—The result of person being threatened with harm by another person if his/her wishes are not carried out.

**Evidence**—Something presented in a legal proceeding which bears on or establishes a point in question.

**Jurisdiction**—The authority, capacity, power, or right of the military to police their own.

**Search**—An examination of a person, property, or premises to uncover evidence of a crime or criminal intent.

**Subject**—A person, about which credible information exists that would cause a reasonable person to suspect the person may have committed a criminal offense, or otherwise make a person the object of a criminal investigation.

## Attachment 2

### USAF SECURITY POLICE MODEL VEHICLE OPERATION POLICY

#### A2.1. Non-Emergency Operation of Security Police Vehicle. Security Police personnel will:

- A2.1.1. Comply with all installation and state laws when operating USAF-owned or leased vehicles.
- A2.1.2. Use seat belts when operating any vehicle.
- A2.1.3. Ensure their assigned vehicles have sufficient gas and oil for their assigned shift and proper inflation of tires.
- A2.1.4. Inspect their assigned vehicles prior to their shift for any damage or missing equipment, and inspect the rear seat area for contraband or evidence. You must inspect the rear seat area after transporting any person.
- A2.1.5. Report all vehicle damage or missing equipment to a supervisor prior to placing the vehicle in service.
- A2.1.6. Keep their vehicles clean and free of trash.

**A2.2. Emergency Driving -- General (Non-Pursuit Situations).** The primary concern in emergency driving situations is protection of lives and the safety of all citizens and security police personnel. During emergency driving situations, security police personnel will operate their vehicles with extreme caution and in compliance with AFI 31-204, *Air Force Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision*, which requires activating the emergency light bar and siren. Driving under emergency conditions does not relieve the vehicle operator from the duty to drive with due regard for safety of all persons, nor will these provisions protect the driver from consequences of his disregard for safety of others.

A2.2.1. Emergency Driving Defined. Emergency driving is operation of an authorized emergency vehicle (emergency lights and siren in operation) by security police personnel in response to a life threatening situation or a violent crime in progress, using due regard for other's safety. ***Note: Drivers should not engage their emergency flashers in an emergency status as it will make turn signals inoperative.***

A2.2.2. Emergency Driving Conditions. The decision to drive under emergency conditions rests with each individual, based on the following conditions:

- A2.2.2.1. Consider factors such as driving abilities, traffic volume, time of day, and potential hazard or liability to themselves and the public.
- A2.2.2.2. Make emergency responses only when the call involves a life threatening situation or a violent crime in progress.
- A2.2.2.3. Justification to drive under emergency conditions requires availability of sufficient information.
- A2.2.2.4. Security police personnel responding to an "officer needs assistance" type call must bear in mind that even though a rapid response is important, they must arrive at the scene safely.

A2.2.3. Deciding to Make an Emergency Response. When making an emergency response, all personnel will immediately notify the desk sergeant of such a decision by using the term "Code Three." This will indicate use of emergency lights and siren. The ranking individual on duty will override the

vehicle operator's decision to make an emergency (Code Three) response if, in his/her judgment, it is not warranted or safe. Additionally:

A2.2.3.1. Security police personnel will not operate a police vehicle in emergency (Code Three) status if it is occupied by any passengers other than security police. If security police are transporting injured personnel to a medical facility, use sound judgment when determining to use an emergency (Code 3) response.

A2.2.3.2. Security police vehicles without emergency lights and siren will not make emergency (Code Three) responses.

**A2.3. Pursuit Driving -- General.** The primary concern in pursuit situations is protection of lives and safety of all citizens and security police personnel. AFI 31-204, *Air Force Motor Vehicle Traffic Supervision*, governs operation of emergency vehicles, which authorizes emergency vehicles (with activated lights and siren) to exceed posted speed limits, but does not relieve the driver of the responsibility to drive with due regard for safety of all persons. It also does not relieve the driver from the consequence of reckless disregard for the safety of others.

A2.3.1. Pursuit Driving -- Defined. *Pursuit driving is an active attempt by security police personnel operating an emergency vehicle and using simultaneously all emergency equipment (lights and siren) to apprehend one or more occupants of another moving vehicle, when the driver of the fleeing vehicle is aware of that attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing his speed, disobeying traffic laws, ignoring the security police officer, or attempting to elude the officer.*

A2.3.2. Pursuit Driving Policies. The following policies govern vehicular pursuits:

A2.3.2.1. Use only security police vehicles equipped with emergency lights and siren.

A2.3.2.2. Use no more than two marked emergency vehicles in the immediate pursuit. Other police vehicles will support pursuit units and will not actively engage in the pursuit.



## **Attachment 3**

### **SECURITY POLICE RESPONSE AND BREVITY CODES**

**A3.1. Code 1 (Routine).** When a call is not given a priority code, assume it is routine.

A3.1.1. Respond by observing all applicable traffic laws.

A3.1.2. Never use emergency lights or siren for any routine call.

A3.1.3. If you become aware of circumstances unknown to the dispatching agency, you may upgrade the response to Code 2 or Code 3. The responsibility for upgrading the call in this fashion rests solely with the responding patrol.

**A3.2. Code 2 (Urgent).**

A3.2.1. A call requiring an immediate response to a non-life-threatening emergency is normally assigned an "urgent" priority.

A3.2.1.1. Respond by observing all applicable traffic laws.

A3.2.1.2. Use emergency lights for all urgent calls.

A3.2.1.3. Sirens are not authorized.

A3.2.1.4. The urgent call is also known as the "silent response." Use this type of response when answering non-life-threatening, crime-in-progress calls.

A3.2.2. Check local, state, territorial, or host nation traffic codes for limitations on use of lights and siren (some traffic codes do not support code 2 responses).

**A3.3. Code 3 (Emergency).** A call requiring an immediate response to a life-threatening emergency or in response to an emergency involving Air Force priority resources is normally assigned an "emergency" priority.

A3.3.1. The use of emergency lights and siren is mandatory; however, use common sense when approaching the scene of the emergency.

A3.3.2. If the emergency lights and siren put security police, victims, or bystanders in peril, turn them off a safe distance from the scene.

**A3.4. Code 4 (Request Wants and Warrants).** Use this code to obtain an outstanding wants and warrants check on a specific person or vehicle. Immediately follow this transmission by listing:

A3.4.1. The complete name and social security number (SSN) of the person (if known).

A3.4.2. Or complete vehicle description and license plate number of the vehicle to be checked.

## **Attachment 4**

### **BLOODBORNE PATHOGENS EXPOSURE CONTROL PLAN**

**A4.1. Bloodborne Pathogens Exposure Control Plan .** Each security police unit will develop a blood-borne pathogen exposure control plan readily available to all unit members. Ensure the plan contains, as a minimum:

A4.1.1. The exposure determination of personnel (those reasonably anticipated, as a result of performing their day-to-day duties, to have skin, eye, mucous membrane, or parenteral contact with blood or other potentially infectious fluids or materials). This determination includes:

A4.1.1.1. A list of all duty positions in which personnel in those positions are likely to be exposed to contaminated material.

A4.1.1.2. A list of all tasks and procedures, or groups of closely related tasks and procedures, in which exposure may occur, and performed by personnel who handle contaminated material.

A4.1.2. The methods available to prevent contact with blood and other potentially infectious fluids or materials.

A4.1.3. Procedures for those who reasonably believe they have contacted a potentially infectious fluid or material.

A4.1.4. Procedures for placing warning labels on containers or plastic bags containing blood or other potentially infectious material. Labels must comply with Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) Standard 1910.1030.

A4.1.5. Procedures for keeping records of all incidents and occupational exposures IAW OSHA Standard 1910.1030.

A4.1.6. Procedures for evaluating circumstances surrounding exposure incidents.

**A4.2. Plan Review and Updates .** Review the exposure control plan at least annually. Update the plan as necessary to reflect new or modified exposure determinations.

**A4.3. Training.** Train security police identified in the exposure determination in the use of protective equipment and disposition of possibly contaminated materials. Qualified security police or hospital personnel may conduct this training.

## **Attachment 5**

### **SECURITY POLICE LESSONS LEARNED REPORT FORMAT**

1. Submitted by: Usually the CSP or squadron commander.
2. Operation/Event Name: The formal name of the military operation or a brief description of the event: RESTORE HOPE in Somalia from 5 August to December 1993, or Use of Deadly Force, Andrews AFB, MD, 1990.
3. Keywords: Critical terms specific enough to facilitate a subject matter automated search. Example: law enforcement, use of deadly force.
4. Title: Name of the incident. Example: murder of an SP/robbery.
5. Observation: A precise, factual description of the entire incident in narrative format. This section should include background information on the subject.
6. Discussion: A critical review of the procedures used and actions accomplished during the incident. The intent is to highlight potential problem areas so readers can prevent similar mistakes or to prompt a review of appropriate policy or procedures.
7. Lessons Learned: A synopsis of a "better way" or a "best business practice" to handle similar future events.
8. Recommended Action: Use this section to outline suggested review actions by higher headquarters.
9. OPR Comments: This is an open area designed for the OPR to add any additional appropriate comments.